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of appeal reversed and held that there was a violation of the
covenant because the purpose of the restriction was not only to
prevent cars from parking on the streets and the incidental
noises, and so forth, but also to limit the size of the commercial
buildings so as to preclude those businesses which need very
large or numerous buildings.
While disposing of the immediate litigation, the opinion of
the court of appeal does not clarify the penetrating issue raised
by the trial judge as to whether the court may disregard the
clear language of a properly-established building restriction
under the pretext of enforcing the substance and intent which
the court distills out of the document. The court of appeal's technique might argue for the affirmative; their holding could be
argued the other way. How far is it necessary for real estate
developers to go into details of intent when they set up new
subdivisions?

SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
Succession of Butler' involved the validity of a revocatory
act in the form of a testament which was offered for probate
as the statutory will of the decedent. The act was attacked on
the grounds (1) that the formalities prescribed by the statute
had not been complied with, not having been signed by the testatrix who had merely affixed her mark, and (2) that the testatrix
was precluded from making a statutory will because she could
not read. 2 The instrument in question had been executed before
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 152 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 244 La. 668, 153 So. 2d
153 (1963).
2. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1962): "In addition to the methods provided in
the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if in writing (whether typewritten,
printed, mimeographed, or written in any other manner), and signed by the

testator in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses in the following
manner:
"(1) Testator. In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator
shall signify to them that the instrument is his will and shall sign each separate
sheet of the instrument.
"(2) Notary public and witnesses. The notary and both witnesses must sign
at the end of the will
"(a) In the presence of the testator, and

"(b) In the presence of each other.
"(3) The foregoing facts shall be evidenced in writing above the signatures
of the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the will. Such
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a notary and two witnesses and it contained a recital of the
declaration of the testatrix that she had never learned to write
as an explanation of her "cross mark instead of her signature."
From the act of superscription it is evident that the instrument
was initially intended as a nuncupative will by public act.4 As
such, however, it would have been invalid for lack of the necessary number of witnesses. The majority of the court affirmed
the probate judge's conclusion that the conflicting evidence adduced preponderated to the effect that the decedent was able to
read,5 and held that the decedent's "X" mark constituted a signature within the contemplation of the requirements of the

statute. 6
As originally proposed in the legislature, the second section

of the statute which now corresponds to R.S. 9:2443 provided:
"Those who know not how to read, and those who know not how
or are not able to sign their names, cannot make dispositions in
the form of the will herein provided for, nor be attesting witnesses thereto." The fact that the italicized language was deleted before the bill was enacted into law forms the basis for
the position of the majority of the court that "had the legislature intended to require the testator to affix a signature to the
will by actually writing his name . . . [it] would have spelled
declaration may be in the following form or a form substantially similar thereto:
(a) Signed (on each page) and declared by testator above named, in our presence
to be his last will and testament, and in the presence of the testator and each
other we have hereunto subscribed our names on this ........ day of ........ , 19 ...........
LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1962) : "Those who know not how or are not able to
read, cannot make dispositions in the form of the will provided for in R.S.
9:2442."
3. ". . . Mrs. Lorenza Domingue . . . did not know how to writ (sic)

her

name for the reason that she has never learned to write, and makes her cross
mark instead of her signature." Succession of Butler, 152 So. 2d 239, 240 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963).
4. "It was thus that said last will and testament was dictated to me, Notary,
,by said Mrs. Lorenza Domingue, in the presence and hearing of said witnesses
and written down by me, Notary, in the presence of said witnesses and said
testatrix. I, Notary, then read said last will and testament to said testatrix in
a clear and audible voice, in the presence and hearing of said testatrix and said
witnesses, when said testatrix declared that she persisted in the same-all of
which was done at one and the same time, without interruption and without
turning aside to other acts." Id. at 241.
5. The dissenting judge, in view of the express declaration of testatrix that
she had never learned to write, expresses grave doubt that she could read. "And
while it is not a necessary corollary that an individual who reads likewise knows
how to write, in 999 cases out of 1,000 I believe that one who does not know
how to write and never had known how to write, such as the testator in this
case, never at anytime knew how to read." Id. at 244.
6. "We are of the opinion that the words 'signed' and 'signature' appearing
on this statute do not mean that a testator must literally write his or her name.
An X mark, properly witnessed, fulfills the requirements thereof in this respect."
Id. at 243.
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out this requisite without the slightest equivocation." ' 7 In the
absence of transcriptions of legislative committee reports and

debates, it is impossible to state with any degree of certitude
what was the reason for the amendment of the bill before its
enactment into law,8 and while the position taken by the ma-

jority of the court is plausible, it is most improbable, as the
dissenting judge indicates, that the legislature would have permitted a person who could not sign his name to use this kind
of a will or to be a witness thereto.9 On the other hand, it is

equally plausible that the deletion of the negative exclusionary
language was made because it was deemed unnecessary in view
of the positive requirement of the first section of the statute
requiring this kind of a will to be "in writing . . . and signed!

by the testator." Words are generally understood in their most
usual signification,1" and it is a cardinal rule of statutory con-

struction that legislative intent must primarily be ascertained
from the language used and not from conjectures aliunde, and
that it is only where the statute is of doubtful meaning that
resort can be had to elements beyond the words of the statute."
7. Id. at 243.

In

support of this position, the majority opinion refers to a

Comment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 288, 289 (1954), wherein the writer concludes that
the fact that the language in question was deleted from the original bill "seems
to indicate a liberal attitude on the part of the legislature regarding the signature of the testator and of the attesting witnesses." (Emphasis added.) While
there is no doubt that the purpose of the 1952 legislation was to adopt a form
of a will free of the many technicalities connected with the making of the nuncupative wills provided for by the Civil Code, yet because of the comparatively
few requirements imposed by the new form, it should not be too difficult for a

qualified notary to properly observe and comply with these requirements.
8. As a matter of fact the entire bill was amended in the Senate before final
passage, after it had been approved in the House in its original form.
9. "If the legislature intended the words 'sign' to include a testator's mark as
well as his signature, then it also must have intended to allow the witness and
the notary to 'sign' by means of a mark. The statute itself indicates on its face
that this was not the desired result, because subsection (3) (a) of Section 2442
requires the will to end with a declaration that it was 'subscribed' by the witnesses and the notary in the presence of each other and of the testator.
Succession of Butler, 152 So. 2d 239, 243-44 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 14 (1870).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 13 (1870) : "When a law is clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 14 (1870) : "The words of law are generally to be understood in their most usual signification, without attending so much to the niceties
of grammar rules as to the general and popular use of the words."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 16 (1870) : "When the words are dubious, their meaning
may be sought by examining the contert with which the ambiguous words,
phrases and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." (Emphasis added.)
LA.

CIVIL

CODE art. 18

(1870): "The universal and most effectual way of

discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious, is by
considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which induced the Legislature
to enact it." (Emphasis added.)
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The terms "sign" and "signature" ordinarily and usually
connote the writing of the name of the signer and not his "X"
mark which, when it is affixed, ordinarily signifies that he could
not "sign" by conventional signature or did not know how to
write his name. 12 As pointed out by the dissenting judge, the
statute "is impregnated with the view that the testator must
be able to read and at least write his name,"' 13 and that to hold
that an "X" mark is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
signature in a statutory testament not only does violence to the
clear and unmistakable language of the statute, but also opens
the door to the perpetration of fraud. 1 4 Significantly, no reference is made in the opinion to Succession of Guidry'5 wherein
the same circuit court of appeal held that the cross mark of the
testator appearing on a nuncupative testament by public act
did not satisfy the requirement of signature, even though it
was the ordinary method by which decedent customarily signed
documents and business papers, 6 and that it was error on the
part of the trial judge to admit evidence tending to establish
17
that the mark was actually the signature of the testator.
In Succession of McLellan'8 the testator bequeathed to the
surviving spouse (1) the usufruct of all his property and (2)
the disposable portion of his estate which consisted, apparently,
solely of his one-half interest in the community of acquets formerly existing between him and his surviving widow. Two of
testator's children by a previous marriage brought suit against
the widow to reduce the disposition in favor of the widow insofar
12. That this was the concept of the notary who drafted this testament is
evident from the recital contained in the instrument that the testatrix made her
cross mark instead of her signature. See supra note 3.
"All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by laws or particular
regulations."
13. Succession of Butler, 152 So. 2d 239, 243 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
14. "If the majority opinion is allowed to stand, the likelihood that forged
testaments will be probated is greatly increased because of the virtual impossibility of properly identifying a mere mark or scratch as that of the testator." Id.
at 244.
15. 145 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. den., 1963.
16. "The contention of appellees that the cross or X mark appearing on the
will in question satisfies the requirement of signature because it constitutes the
ordinary signature or method by which decedent customarily signed documents
and business papers and thereby eliminated the necessity of expressly mentioning
the reason for testatrix's failure to sign by conventional signature, is clearly
without foundation under the laws of this state." Id. at 616.
17. "It also follows that the learned trial court erred . . . in admitting evidence over appellants' objection to establish that the cross or X mark appearing
on the testament in question was the signature of the alleged testatrix."
18. 144 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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as it impinged upon their legitime, specifically praying to be
recognized as owners of their proportionate share of their forced
portion free of the usufruct in favor of the widow. The court
of appeal, relying on article 1752 of the Civil Code

9

which has

to do with donations between husband and wife, affirmed the
lower court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that
under the express provisions of that article, the widow was

entitled either to the "usufruct of the property or the disposable
portion in naked ownership" but not to both.20 A third child
of the testator, issue of the latter's marriage with his widow,

also received his proportionate share of the legitime, but as
to him, the disposition of the usufruct thereon in favor of the
21
widow was not disturbed.

Under article 174622 of the Civil Code, one of the spouses
may give to the other all that he or she may give to a stranger.
To this general rule, however, several exceptions were made

which more or less restricted the spouses' power of alienation
by establishing a fixed disposable portion in certain situations.
For example, under article 1752 as originally enacted, a person who contracted a second marriage having children by a
former marriage could give to his spouse only the usufruct of a
child's share, which could in no case exceed one-fifth of the
donor's estate. 23 In 1882 the quantum was increased to onethird of the donor's property, which could be given either in

full ownership or in usufruct.24 In such cases, therefore, instead
19. LA. CivIL CODE art. 1752 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1916, No. 116:
"A man or a woman who contracts a second marriage, having a child or children
by a former marriage, can give to his wife, or she to her husband, either by
donation inter vivos or by last will and testament, in full property or in usufruct,
all of that portion of his estate, or her estate, as the case may be that he or
she could legally give to a stranger."
20. "Therefore, the defendant herein is entitled to the usufruct of the property or the disposable portion in naked ownership, but not both." Succession of
McLellan, 144 So. 2d 291, 295 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
21. As to this child, his legitime would be burdened with a usufruct in favor
of the surviving spouse anyhow. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870) ; Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888) ; Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67,
96 So.2d 44 (1957).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1746 (1870) : "One of the married couple may,
either by marriage contract or during the marriage, give to the other, in full
property, all that he or she might give to a stranger."
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1752 (1870) : "A man or a woman, who contracts
a second or subsequent marriage, having children by a former one, can give to his
wife, or she to her husband, only the least child's portion, and that only as a
usufruct; and in no case shall the portion, of which the donee is to have the
usufruct, exceed the fifth part of the donor's estate."
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1752 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1882, No. 13:
"A man or a woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having
children by a former one, can give to his wife, or she to her husband either by
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of being governed by article 1493 of the Civil Code, 25 the disposable quantum was subject to the limitations of article 1752,
so that where the donor or testator having children by a former
marriage made a donation in favor of his wife, the donation
could, at the option of the children, be reduced to one-third of
the donor's property either in full ownership or in usufruct. 26
The 1916 amendment of article 1752 which increased the disposable quantum to the portion which can legally be given to
a stranger, has now eliminated the problem in this respect, but
only as to the quantum. The article still provides that this disposable portion can be given only in "full property or in usufruct. ' ' 27 It appears, therefore, that the plaintiffs in this case
could have insisted on a reduction of the disposition to the
widow to the disposable portion, or to the usufruct on that
disposable portion. 28 As it is, the only effect of the judgment
is to recognize the forced heirs of the testator as entitled to
their legitime free of the usufruct thereon in favor of the widow,
which result could have been reached without any difficulty
by the simple application of article 1710 of the Civil Code which
provides that no charges or conditions can be imposed by the
testator on the legitimate portion of the forced heirs. 29
Two cases, Succession of Willis"0 and Succession of Andrews,3 1 restate the rule of Cormier v. Myers3 2 that evidence
of duress, force, or undue influence is inadmissible for the purpose of invalidating a testament unless present at the making
of the will and then only for the purpose of showing mental
testamentary incapacity. 33 In each case, the disposition in the
donation or by last will and testament, in full property, or in usufruct, not
exceeding one-third of his or her property."
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1493 (1870) : "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa
can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his
decease, a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if

he leaves three or a greater number. ..

."

26. Succession of Braswell, 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918).

27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1752 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1916, No. 116.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1754 (1870) : "Husbands and wives can not give to each
other, indirectly beyond what is permitted by the foregoing dispositions ...
.
28. Succession of Braswell, 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918).
29. Since these plaintiffs were not the issue of the marriage between the
testator and the surviving spouse, the latter would not, under article 916 of the
Civil Code, be legally entitled to the usufruct on the portion inherited by them.
Consequently, the burdening of their legitime with a usufruct in favor of the
survivor would be a charge prohibited by article 1710.
30. 149 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), cert. den., 244 La. 132, 150
So. 2d 589 (1963).
31. 153 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
32. 233 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
33. In both cases the court finds that the evidence adduced was insufficient
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wills, whereby the nurse who had attended the testator professionally during the illness of which he died was made residuary legatee, were attacked as being contrary to the public
policy said to be expressed by article 1489 of the Civil Code,
alleging that although not within the letter of the article, a
nurse came within the spirit thereof because the article prohibits those who have professionally ministered to the testator
during his illness from benefiting by any donations made to
them during that sickness by reason of the influence they can
exert over the ill. In support of their position, opponents relied
on Cormier v. Myers, 34 wherein the Supreme Court had indicated that, while the keeper of a boarding house for the aged is
not expressly included within the terms of article 1489, he was
nevertheless included within the spirit thereof.8 5 In both cases
the courts of appeal conclude that a registered nurse is not precluded eo nomine by the terms of the article from receiving
donations made to them by the patient whom they attend, and
reject the public policy argument as being unsound, the expressions of the Supreme Court in the Cormier case to the contrary
notwithstanding, such expressions being obiter dicta.3 6 Granting
that nurses may be in a position to exert the same influence
over the sick as doctors and ministers of the gospel, both appellate courts take the position that whether they should be
excluded or not is a legislative and not a judicial question."1
Succession of Centani38 was an action to annul a nuncupative
will by public act under which the defendant had been sent
into possession some nine years previously. The action was
based on the fact that the will was dictated in a language underto sustain a finding that the testator was mentally incapable at the time of the
confection of the testament.
34. 223 La. 259, 65 So. 2d 345 (1953).
35. " 'The public policy of this State, as expressed in Article 1489 ...
prohibits those who attend a sick person, or who wait on them professionally during
their last illness, from benefiting by a donation inter vivos, or mortis causa,
because of the influence they can exert over the ill. While the keeper of a
boarding house for the aged and infirm is not included in this category by letter,
the spirit is there.' " Id. at 273, 65 So. 2d at 350.
36. Any doubt as to the correctness of this conclusion has been removed by
the Supreme Court in its per curiam denying writs in the Willis case: ". . . The
assertion of the Court of Appeal that statements made in Cormier v. Myers ...
are dicta, is correct." Succession of Willis, 244 La. 132, 150 So. 2d 589 (1963).
37. "As the vocation of nursing has been practiced since the early days of
Christianity, the redactors of our civil code obviously did not intend to include
nurses under Article 1489. Whether the lawmakers should have also listed nurses
because they are in a position to exert the same influence over the ill as doctors
is not a judicial question." Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218, 220 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963).
38. 142 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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stood only by one of the witnesses who translated it into English
as it was being written by the notary. Reasoning from Miller
v. Miller,3 9 wherein it had been held that although the total
failure to read a nuncupative will by private act was a formal
defect which would render the will null, an action to declare its
nullity could not be instituted after the five-year prescription
of article 3542 of the Civil Code had run, 40 the Court of Appeal
for the Fourth Circuit holds that while the inability of a necessary witness to a nuncupative will by public act to understand
the language in which the testament is written or that in which
it is dictated also renders the testament null, 41 the action of
nullity prescribes by five years.4 2 In Succession of Pizani,43
where the action of nullity was timely instituted, the court held
invalid a will executed in the nuncupative form by public act,
because of the absence of the recital that the testament had been
read back to the testator in the presence of witnesses. In the
case of a statutory will, however, the failure to read it aloud
44
does not render it null.
39. 32 La. Ann. 437 (1880).
40. "There can be no doubt that the reading of the nuncupative will by private act is necessary to its validity; but C.C. 1649, in pointing out what proof
is required to probate such a will, does not enumerate proof that the will was
read. Whether or not this singular divergence between what is required for the
validity of the will and the quantum of proof required for the probate renders null
a probate made according to the requisites of C.C. 1649, is a question we need
not consider, because we think the plaintiff's case, in so far as it attacks for
nullity of form, is barred by the prescription of five years, which has been
pleaded." Id. at 440-41.
41. "The inability of a necessary witness to a nuncupative will by public act
to understand either the language in which the will is written or the language
in which the same is dictated renders the will null; and such a will is also null
where the testator does not understand the language in which the notary wrote
and read the will. Debaillon v. Fuselier, 159 La. 1044, 106 So. 559; Lataprie v.
Baudot, 152 La. 177, 92 So. 776; Succession of D'Auterive, 39 La. Ann. 1092,
3 So. 341; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 13 La. 104." Succession of Centani, 142 So. 2d
636, 638 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
42. The decision is in accord with prior jurisprudence. See Succession of
Semere, 10 La. Ann. 684 (1855) and Succession of Justus, 47 La. Ann. 302,
16 So. 841 (1895) in which an action to annul a will defective as to form because
of the failure to state the residence of the witness was held prescribed by 5 years
from the date of probate. See also Cox v. Lea's Heirs, 110 La. 1030, 35 So. 275
(1902).
43. 146 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
44. 244 La. 203, 151 So. 2d 493 (1963). This question had been raised in,
but not adjudicated upon by, the court of appeal when the case was before it.
See Succession of Pizani, 148 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).

